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Grey directors, corporate governance and firms 
performance nexus: Evidence from Nigeria
Damilola Felix Eluyela1*, Abiola John Asaleye2, Olabisi Popoola3, Adedoyin Isola Lawal2 and 
Henry Inegbedion3
Abstract:  There has been a consistent argument in the literature as regards the 
importance of grey directors on board, and their impact on firm performance with 
most studies focused on developed economies. However, little is known on the short 
and long-run implications. In this study, we examined the joint short-run and long- 
run causality relationship, as well as the long-run behaviour between grey directors 
and corporate performance of deposit money banks. Our sample includes 14 
deposit money banks out of the 15 listed on Nigeria stock exchange for 2010–2017. 
The estimation techniques used include descriptive statistics, unit root test, panel 
co-integration test and fully modified ordinary least square regression (FMOLS). 
Using Tobin Q as the dependent variable, there is no flow of joint long-run causality 
from the independent variables. The significance of the short-run coefficients indi-
cates joint causality moving from independent variable to the dependent variable in 
the short-run. Furthermore, the long-run equation shows a significant positive 
relationship between indigenous directors, the board size, non-executive directors 
and performance of the selected deposit money banks in Nigeria, while a negative 
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correlation was observed with firm size. Grey director was insignificant in the long- 
run. The study concludes that aggregate policy changes need to carefully consid-
ered in promoting a long-term benefit and need to gear effort towards maximising 
the performance of the banking sector in the long-run through effective group 
decision.
Subjects: Business; Finance; Management and Accounting;  
Keywords: causality; corporate governance; financial performance; grey directors
1. Introduction
Corporate governance arises as a result of the separation of ownership and control of a business 
enterprise. Several committees and authors have attempted to define the concept of “corporate 
governance”. However, there has been subjectivity about what constitutes corporate governance. 
One of the most used definitions is the Cadbury report of 2002. The committee defines corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Good corporate 
governance practices and an effective corporate board structure are essential in achieving a high 
level of public trust and confidence of shareholders and stakeholders. One of the primary reasons 
why companies across the world fail is as a result of poor corporate governance (Abu et al., 2016; 
Otekunrin et al., 2018a, 2018b). Corporate board is the hallmark of every internal corporate 
governance mechanism. Board of directors is expected to act in the best interest of shareholders 
by ensuring the maximisation of their wealth. In achieving this objective, they perform the 
monitoring role and ensure the presence of a disciplined atmosphere within the organisation 
(Eluyela et al., 2019a). The effectiveness of every board depends on its composition.
Grey directors or affiliate directors are part of the board composition of companies. Kumar and 
Singh (2012) noted that grey directors are the non-executive director who has a business or personal 
relationship with the company and is non-employee of the company. As a result of their position, they 
emphasise monitoring opportunistic behaviour among other managers, thereby reducing earnings 
management practices to achieve the goals of shareholders. Giaretta (2012) presumed grey directors 
as persons who have relations with companies and do not participate in the day-to-day running of 
the company operations. Seema (2016) considers grey director responsibility to be more like that of 
outside directors and constitute nonexecutive directors group with the outside directors.
There has been a consistent argument in the literature as regards the importance of grey directors 
on board and their impact on firm performance. This results in two different schools of thought. One 
school of thought (Kumar & Singh, 2012; Giaretta, 2012; Abu et al., 2016; among others) believes that 
the presence of grey directors in board composition of a company creates an atmosphere of 
independence and ultimately leads to better firm performance. On the other hand, some scholars 
(Abu et al., 2016; Otman, 2014; among others) asserted to the fact that when grey directors are 
present on the board composition of a company, there is no effect on the performance of such 
company instead the rate of conflict of interest in the organization might increase. Empirically, 
a strand of literature documented that positive relationship exists between firm performance and 
governance in banking and financial sectors (Al-Matari et al., 2012; Rodrigs & Barnes, 2015; among 
others) while other documented a negative relationship (Abu et al., 2016; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
However, limited studies have investigated the effects of grey director on firm performance, most 
notably in Nigeria. Likewise, numerous studies in the literature have established that there is a causal 
relationship between various board compositions (inside directors, outside directors, non-executive 
directors, CEO duality, gender diversity) and financial performance of firms. More interestingly, Kumar 
and Singh (2012) examined the impact of outside directors and firm performance in India, but the 
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joint short-run and long-run causality was not considered by this study where the previous research 
established that a causal relationship exists. Others included the studies by (Abu et al., 2016; 
Obaretin, 2015; Song et al., 2017; Zakaria, 2012). However, most of these studies did not examine 
the effect concerning time frame perspectives, which make the analysis limited in policy recommen-
dations in this regard. Studies by (Dogan & Yildiz, 2013; Georgantopoulos & Filos, 2017) have shown 
that time perspectives matter in the analysis of governance and firm performance.
This study aims to fill this gap identified in the literature. Against this backdrop, the primary 
objective of this study is to examine the joint short-run and long-run causality relationship 
between grey directors on the corporate performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, this study assessed the long-run behaviour between grey directors and performance 
of the selected deposit money banks in Nigeria. The empirical significance of this study will help to 
determine the importance of grey directors in the board composition of every company. We 
hypothesise that the inclusion of grey directors on board will have a significant effect on the 
financial performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. This study contributed to the manage-
ment and corporate governance literature as follows: (1) provides the first empirical evidence on 
the short-run and long-run relationships between grey directors and bank performance in Nigeria, 
(2) it uses a novel dataset on bank performance for a panel of banks in Nigeria. The analysis makes 
use of 14 deposit money banks out of the 15 listed on Nigeria stock exchange, while the study 
utilises annual data spanning the period from 2010 to 2017.
The subsequent part of this study is arranged as follows; section 2 contains various literature 
reviewed on the subject matter; then section 3 presents the theoretical framework, model speci-
fication and sources of data used in the study; section 4 consists of the findings, discussions and 
implication of the study; finally, section 5 present the concluding remarks, recommendations and 
suggestion for further research.
2. Literature review
Strand of theories explaining the relationship between grey directors, executive, shareholders, owners 
and workers in an organisation have been identified in the literature. One of the foremost is agency 
theory (Eluyela et al., 2019b; Logan, 2000; Tate et al., 2010; Wasserman, 2006). The theory stressed 
that executive managers act to actualise the goals and objectives of the owners or shareholders of 
the organisation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, monitoring to realise these objectives is one of 
the primary roles or duties of the non-executive directors or grey directors. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) pointed out the monitoring generated an extra cost on the organisation and may lead to 
inefficiencies. Likewise, Panda and Leepsa (2017) echoed that the conflict of interest and agency cost 
is a result of ownership separation. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory offers unique 
insight into formation systems, which, on the other hand, helps to reduce uncertainty, and increase 
incentives for the continuation of the organisation. This view has been supported empirically as well 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Argawal & Mandelker, 1987; Barney, 1988; Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
1985, 1988; Ozordi et al., 2019; Wolfson, 1985) while some documented mixed result in respect to this 
(Anderson, 1985; Eccles, 1985; Kosnik, 1987). The study by Pepper and Gore (2012) contradicts the 
view. The scholars pointed out the assumption of the contractual agreement in the model among 
agents in the presence of uncertainty is not realistic due to information asymmetry, mismanagement 
of resources, transaction cost, among others. This makes each agent patronise self-interest rather 
than organisation goals, most notably the shareholders. The directors are given the monitoring role; 
however, further functions to improve the organisation are not well stated in the theory. In this 
regard, Pepper and Gore (2012) viewed the manager as opportunistic and believed that the theory 
neglects the proficiency of the mangers.
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Empirically, Hastori et al. (2015) investigated the impact of agency cost on Agro-companies in 
Indonesia. The author documented that ownership involvement is not statistically significant with 
agency cost. More so, Rashid (2015) reported that a positively significant relationship exists 
between market performance and institutional investors in Bangladesh. The implications of execu-
tive directors, most especially the grey directors, remain inconclusive in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. Although, due to the complex nature of the organisation, Eisenhardt (1989) 
stressed the need to incorporate other relevant theories to effectively explain the behaviour using 
the agency theory. Another model that describes the action of executive directors, workers and 
owners in an organisation is the stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 
1999; Ozordi et al., 2020). However, a vast literature emphasised that the theory is limited in 
application due to lack of identification of stakeholder groups (Dunfee, 2008; Dunham et al., 2006; 
Freeman et al., 2010; Orts & Strudler, 2009). The reason was justified by the study of Crane and 
Ruebottom (2011) that investigate the implication of social identity in the model.
Extant studies have been carried out on good governance system and firm performance; The 
study of Otman (2014) observed the impact of corporate governance on firm performance using 
listed firms in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study adopts agency and stakeholder 
theories. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS), the findings 
show that corporate governance has a significant impact on firm performance and stakeholder 
model is more appropriate in UAE. Similarly, in India, Kumar and Singh (2012) carried out a study 
on the effect of outside directors on firm performance. The study used a sample of 157 non- 
financial Indian firms for one year only (2008). These cross-sectional data gathered revealed that 
a negative and significant relationship exists between outside directors and firm performance 
while insignificant relationship exists between independent directors and firm performance. On 
a broader scope, Rodrigs and Barnes (2015) investigated the impact of independent directors on 
firm performance in Europe. The study used three measures of financial performance which are 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. Using ordinary least square 
regression (OLS), the study disagrees with the work of (Kumar & Singh, 2012) that there is 
a significant and positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance 
using any of the three measures.
More so, Al-Matari et al. (2012) analyzed the connection between board attributes and the firm 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Kuwaiti. They embraced agency theory and data were 
gathered from a sample of 136 organizations for only one year (2009). Multiple linear regression 
analysis was utilized and they find that there is a positive relationship between board attributes 
and firm performance in Kuwaiti. Giaretta (2012) explored the effect of private equity investment 
on firm productivity and development of the organization in Italy. The examination was led to 
making a probit model to test the factual centrality of factors intended to quantify the effect of 
private equity on target organizations. The outcome demonstrated that private equity investment 
has a significant effect on firm performance and productivity.
In Nigeria, Sunday and Godwin (2017) assessed the impact of board globalizing on banks 
performance in Nigeria. The examination adopting ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
Findings show that outside board enrollment, resource development and institutional proprie-
torship have a significant positive association with bank performance in Nigeria. Additionally, 
Obaretin (2015) investigated on board qualities and firm performance in Nigerian listed orga-
nizations. While embracing the stakeholder’s theory, the time series data gathered from 166 
firms quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange market (NSE) found a positive and significant 
association between independent directors and firm performance in Nigeria. Abu et al. (2016) 
explored board attributes and performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. Utilizing 
the agency theory, the findings show that grey directors have a significant and negative 
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relationship with firm performance and foreign directors are significant and positively asso-
ciated with firm performance.
However, most of the studies on bank performance in Nigeria are not particularly related to grey 
directors (Abu et al., 2016; Adegboyegun et al., 2020; Obaretin, 2015; Sunday & Godwin, 2017). The 
model used in this study helps to achieve series of objectives, which include examining the impact 
of grey directors and corporate governance on the performance of selected Nigeria deposit money 
banks both in the long and short run. This work also aims at determining how important grey 
directors are in the board composition of every company.
3. Theoretical framework and model specification
3.1. Theoretical framework
We adopted agency theory in this study. This is based on the premise that the involvement of grey 
directors on board members is a dimension of board attributes. Agency theory has its widest use 
among researchers in economics and finance. This theory stems from the fact of the separation of 
ownership and control of a business enterprise (Eluyela et al., 2018b; Folashade et al., 2016). This 
separation arises from the two major parties involved in the theory, which are the principal 
(shareholders), and the agent (board of directors). The principal appoints the agent to act in 
their best interest and they are being rewarded in return (Nwanji et al., 2020). The agent (board 
of directors) comprises various attributes, which allows them to ensure the proper running of the 
business enterprise and give room for proper monitoring and control. Some of the board attributes 
include CEO duality (the Chairman acting as the CEO), grey directors, non-executive directors 
(presence of NED on board), gender diversity (a balance between male and female directors on 
the board). Based on the inconclusive result from previous studies and existing theories, we stated 
the following hypothesis below: 
H1: There is no joint short-run causal relationship between grey directors and performance of 
deposit money banks in Nigeria.
H2: There is no joint long-run causal relationship between grey directors and performance of 
deposit money banks in Nigeria.
H3: There is no long-run relationship between grey directors and performance of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria.
3.2. Model specification
This study adopted the work of Le and Quah (2018) with slight adjustment as follows: 
TobQit ¼ αit þ α1GRDit þ α2INDit þ α3NEDit þ α4BSIZEit þ α5FSIZEit þ δit (1) 
Where TOBQ denotes the Tobin Q (firm performance), GRD represents grey directors, IND refers to 
indigenous directors, NED is non-executive directors, the control variables are BSIZE and FSIZE, 
which denotes board size and firm size respectively. i and t represent firm-specific and time 
respectively. We used TOBQ as our dependent variable for measuring corporate performance. 
This is a wide used proxy because it measures both market and book values of a company 
performance (Vafeas, 1999). As a result of this, TOBQ has edge over all other accounting perfor-
mance measures that are only based on book values (Eluyela et al., 2018a, 2018b). The measure-
ment of all variables is presented in Table 1.
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3.3. Methods and design
The analysis makes use of 14 deposit money banks out of the 15 listed on Nigeria stock exchange, 
while the study utilizes annual data spanning the period from 2010 to 2017. The rationale for 
selecting the samples is based on data availability. To investigate the relationships between grey 
directors, indigenous directors and firm performance for the deposit money banks in Nigeria firm, 
we used a panel data methodological approach. The justification for this is due to several 
advantages panel data have over time series and cross-sectional data (without respect to time 
differences like in case of panel data). According to Adetula et al. (2016) and Uwuigbe et al. (2018), 
the panel advantage includes: firstly, when dealing with short time series, panel data allow for 
more observations to be tested and this result in a high power of causality test. Secondly, the panel 
data help to control for heterogeneity and collinearity issues among variables (Attanasio, 2006; Le 
& Quah, 2018; Olopade et al., 2019).
In this study, first, the descriptive statistics were presented showing the measures of central 
tendency for all variables (Ademola et al., 2020; Umukoro et al., 2020). Then after, we tested for 
stationarity of each variable using Panel Unit Root test. The unit root test is considered as the 
pretest and essential in order to determine the most appropriate technique to be utilized in the 
empirical analysis (Asaleye et al., 2018; Lawal et al., 2018; Oladipo et al., 2019c; Oladipo et al., 
2019a, 2019b). Thirdly, we assess whether a long-run relationship exists among variables using co- 
integration test. In the presence of cointegration, there is a tendency for a causal relationship 
among the series (Asaleye et al., 2019; Popoola et al., 2018). Furthermore, we tested for causality 
among the variables. The causality test comprises joint short-run and joint long-run causality 
following Masih and Masih (1996) approach. This means that GRD, IND, NED, BSIZE and FSIZE 
jointly explain TOBQ behaviour in the short-run and long-run. We, therefore, adopt the model of 
Kao and Chiang (2000) to determine the long-run behaviour, given as; 
yit ¼ φi þ @Xit þ∑nk¼1CikΔXit  n þ δit (2) 
In Equation (2), Cikis the coefficient of lead and lag of the first differenced explanatory variables 
based on their unit-root test. Error term is denoted as δit.
In order to use error correction model (ECM), it is assumed all variables must be significant at 
first difference- I(1). Thus, we adopt the test of Westerlund (2007) in analyzing whether co- 
Table 1. Measurement of Variables
Variables Variables Type Measurement of Variables
TOBQ Dependent Variable Book value of total assets plus 
market value of equity divided by 
book value of total assets
GRD Independent Variable Percentage of grey directors on 
board
IND Percentage of national directors on 
board
NED Percentage of non-executive 
directors on board
BSIZE Control Variable Number of board members
FSIZE Natural logarithm of bank total 
assets
Source: Authors’ Compilation (2019). 
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integration exists among individual variables and also for the panel as a whole. We further used 
fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) to examine the long-run relationship among vari-
ables. The justification for using FMOLS is that it revises for both endogeneity predisposition and 
sequential connection. The investigation first gauges the long-run parameters in Equation (1) by 
means of the FMOLS estimator to obtain the residual. We then defined the first lagged residual to 
be equal to the error correction term and thereafter generated the following equations: 
ΔTobQit ¼ α1i þ∑nk¼1α11 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α12 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α13 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α14 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α15 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α16 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ1iECTit  1
þ δ1it (3)  
ΔGRDit ¼ α2i þ∑nk¼1α21 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α22 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α23 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α24 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α25 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α26 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ2iECTit  1
þ δ2it (4)  
ΔINDit ¼ α3i þ∑nk¼1α31 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α32 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α33 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α34 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α35 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α36 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ3iECTit  1
þ δ3it (5)  
ΔNEDit ¼ α4i þ∑nk¼1α41 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α42 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α43 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α44 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α45 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α46 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ4iECTit  1
þ δ4it (6)  
ΔBSIZEit ¼ α5i þ∑nk¼1α51 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α52 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α53 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α54 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α55 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α56 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ5iECTit  1
þ δ5it (7)  
ΔFSIZEit ¼ α6i þ∑nk¼1α61 ipΔTobQit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α62 ipΔGRDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α63 ipΔINDit  n
þ∑nk¼1α64 ipΔNEDit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α65 ipΔBSIZEit  n þ∑
n
k¼1α66 ipΔFSIZEit  n þ ϕ6iECTit  1
þ δ6it (8) 
Where ∆ represents first difference and the lag length based on Akaike information criterion is 
determined. ECT represents the error correction term and the adjustment parameters are 
ϕji(k = 1,2,3,4,5,6). The significance of the error correction term at the level of 5 per cent, less 
than 1 in absolute and with negative coefficient validate the long-run joint causality (Asaleye et al., 
2018; Masih & Masih, 1996; Popoola et al., 2019). While the WALD test is employed to test for the 
joint run causality by imposing restrictions on the independent variables and the lags. The null 
hypothesis test involves if the independent variables and the lags are not statistically different 
from zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis validates the joint short-run causality among the series.
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4. Discussion of result and implications
4.1. Discussion of result
From Table 2, the variable with the highest mean value is BSIZE at 14.13, which shows high 
performance in respect to other variables. Subsequently, TOBQ standard deviation of 0.08 is the 
lowest standard deviation among all variables used. This shows that TOBQ has low fluctuation with 
respect to other variables. The average percentage of grey directors and non-executive directors is 
12.9% and 58.9% respectively. This clearly shows that most of the sampled companies have 
a mixture of outside directors and non-executive directors in their board composition. The average 
board size for the sampled firms is between 7 and 25. This means that the board size of the 
sampled firms is appropriate for firm’s optimum performance as evidenced (Al-Matari et al., 2012) 
by who affirms that a firm with bigger board size has the potential for better performance. TOBQ 
shows a mean of 1.14 with minimum and maximum values ranging from 1.00 to 1.89.
Table 3 shows the preliminary test (panel unit root) for each variable. We based our test on four 
different criteria (Levin, Lin & Chu t, LPS, ADF-Fisher and PP-Fisher). All variables were significant at 
first difference using 1% and 5% significant level. Only TOBQ was significant at 5% while all other 
variables were significant at 1%. Since all variables are significant at I (1), we used panel VECM to 
estimate the short and long-run causality among the dependent and independent variables.
Table 4 shows the panel co-integration test. This test was used to examine the presence of 
a long-run relationship among variables. We present the statistics and a probability level of 11 
tests. A long-run relationship exists when at least six out of the eleven tests are statistically 
significant at the level of 5 per cent. From Table 4, it is evident that a long-run relationship exists 
among variables since Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADF-Statistic, Panel PP-statistic (weighted), Panel 
ADF-statistics (weighted) and Group ADF-Statistics are statistically significant at the level of 
5 per cent.
Table 5 presents joint short and long-run causality using TOBQ as the independent variable. Two 
hypotheses are tested each for joint long-run and short-run causality. For joint long-run causality, 
the null hypothesis of “no evidence of joint-long run causality” and the alternate hypothesis of 
“evidence of joint-long run causality”. If the long-run coefficient is negative and its significance at 
the level of 5 per cent validate the joint long-run causality; by this, it means that the independent 
variables jointly cause the dependent variable in the long-run. In Table 5, C (1) indicates the long- 
run coefficient with the coefficient value of 0.000342 (which is positive) and a probability value of 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
TOBQ GRD IND NED BSIZE FSIZE
Mean 1.140111 0.129420 0.868800 0.589659 14.13514 11.64298
Median 1.132900 0.120000 0.880000 0.583300 14.00000 11.85370
Maximum 1.897300 0.538500 1.000000 0.833300 25.00000 12.68430
Minimum 1.002600 0.000000 0.461500 0.000000 7.000000 9.010700
Std. Dev. 0.086397 0.130076 0.131495 0.116997 2.915434 0.758520
Skewness 6.042859 0.725080 −0.690761 −0.815586 0.336712 −1.647684
Kurtosis 54.43183 2.912336 2.791756 7.838201 3.780946 6.185993
Sum 126.5523 14.36560 96.43680 65.45210 1569.000 1292.371
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.821080 1.861183 1.902000 1.505724 934.9730 63.28877
Source: Authors’ Compilation (2019). 
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Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test
Variable Method Level- I(0) First Difference- I(1)
TOBQ Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.1123 0.0000*
LPS 0.1834 0.0128**
ADF_fisher 0.1158 0.0234**
PP- Fisher 0.6228 0.0459**
GRD Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.1211 0.0000*
LPS 0.5231 0.0000*
ADF_fisher 0.1051 0.0005*
PP- Fisher 0.1998 0.0000*
IND Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.5123 0.0000*
LPS 0.2119 0.0000*
ADF_fisher 0.1023 0.0000*
PP- Fisher 0.1141 0.0000*
NED Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.1222 0.0000*
LPS 0.2576 0.0001*
ADF_fisher 0.1100 0.0000*
PP- Fisher 0.2110 0.0000*
BSIZE Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.2131 0.0000*
LPS 0.4521 0.0089*
ADF_fisher 0.1033 0.0046*
PP- Fisher 0.1984 0.0000*
FSIZE Levin, Lin & Chu t 1.0000 0.0001*
LPS 0.6782 0.0011*
ADF_fisher 0.1846 0.0006*
PP- Fisher 0.1063 0.0001*
Note: * and ** represent that variables are stationary at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Compilation (2019). 
Table 4. Panel Co-Integration Test
Test Statistics Probability
Panel v-Statistic 0.704859 0.2404
Panel rho-Statistic 0.752549 0.7741
Panel PP-Statistic −4.534109 0.0000**
Panel ADF-Statistic −1.986611 0.0235**
Panel v-Statistic (Weighted) 0.732683 0.2319
Panel rho-Statistic (Weighted) 0.647196 0.7412
Panel PP-Statistic (Weighted) −3.910744 0.0000**
Panel ADF-Statistic (Weighted) −3.740551 0.0001**
Group rho-Statistic −5.608717 0.9562
Group PP-Statistic −5.608717 0.0000**
Group ADF-Statistic −5.042313 0.0000**
** represent that test is significant at 5% probability level. 
Source: Authors’ Compilation (2019). 
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0.9961. Since the coefficient value is positive and the probability value is higher than 0.05, hence, 
the null hypothesis of no joint long-run causality is accepted at the level of 5 per cent significance.
Likewise, for joint short-run causality, the null hypothesis of “no evidence of joint-short run causality” 
and the alternate hypothesis of “evidence of joint-short run causality”. Using the WALD test statistics, 
the significance of the short-run coefficients indicates joint causality moving from independent variable 
to the dependent variable in the short-run. C (2) to C (13) are the short-run coefficients. It can be 
depicted from Table 5, that the null hypothesis of no joint short is rejected at the level of 5 per cent 
since the chi-square value is 29.99915 with a probability value of 0.0028 which is lower than 0.05 
significance level. Hence, the alternate hypothesis of “evidence of joint-short run causality” is accepted.
Table 6 presents the result of the fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) regression. We 
used the FMOLS to show long-run behaviour between grey directors and performance of deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. Our R-squared (coefficient of determination) is 80 per cent. This means 
that the variation in dependent variables is explained by 80 per cent of the variation in the 
independent variables. The Adjusted R-Squared of 78 per cent is lower than the R-Squared because 
into consideration the degree of freedom. Furthermore, examining the individual variables, grey 
directors (GRD) have a coefficient of 0.000464 and probability value of 0.4495, which is not 
statistically significant at 5%. Also, board size (BSIZE) has a coefficient of 0.000192 and probability 
value of 0.9273 which is not statistically significant at 5%.
However, the other variables are significant. Indigenous director (IND) has a coefficient of 
0.050378 and probability value of 0.0241, which is statistically significant at 5%. Holding all 
other variables constant, one unit change in IND will lead to about 2.4 per cent increment in 
TOBQ in the long-run. Also, non-executive directors (NED) with a coefficient of 0.012317 and 
probability value of 0.0067 which is statistically significant at 5%. Holding all other variables 
constant, one unit change in non-executive directors- NED will lead to about 12 per cent change 
in the TOBQ. Lastly, firm size (FSIZE) with a coefficient of −0.086034 and probability value of 0.0405 
which is statistically significant at 5%. The coefficient shows a negative relationship between firm 
size (FSIZE) and performance (TOBQ) of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Holding all other variables 
constant, one unit change in FSIZE will lead to about 9 per cent reduction change in TOBQ.
4.2. Implications of findings
This study investigates the relationship among grey directors, corporate governance and firm 
performance in Nigeria. Evidence from the descriptive statistics showed that variable with highest 
mean value is board size; this shows high performance in respect to other variables such as firm 
performance, grey directors, indigenous directors of the company, non-executive directors and 
Table 5. Joint Short and Long-run Causality
Joint Long-run Causality
Null Hypothesis: No evidence of joint long-run causality
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics Probability Decision
C(1) 0.000342 0.069556 0.004912 0.9961 Accepted
Joint Short-run Causality
Null Hypothesis: No evidence of joint short-run causality
Variable Statistics Value df Probability Decision
C(2): C(13) Chi-square 29.99915 12 0.0028 Rejected
Source: Authors’ Computation (2019). 
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firm size within the period of 2010 to 2017. The significant performance of the board size may be 
as the result of the establishment of the indigenous act of 1977, which states that at least 
60 per cent of the board members must be a Nigerian by citizenship. Subsequently, the indicator 
of firm performance has the lowest standard deviation in comparison to all other variables. This 
indicates that firm performance has low fluctuation with respect to other variables. The average 
percentage of grey directors and non-executive directors is within 12 and 58 per cent. This clearly 
shows that most of the sampled companies have a mixture of outside directors and non-executive 
directors in their board composition. Likewise, the average board size for the sampled firms is 
between 7 and 25, indicating that the board size of the sampled firms is appropriate for firm’s 
optimum performance as evidenced in the study by Al-Matari et al. (2012).
Based on the outcome of the unit root test and cointegration result, the study used the Panel Vector 
Error Correction Model and adopted the approach outlined by Masih and Masih (1996) to establish the 
joint short and long-run causality, while the fully modified least square was used to investigate the long- 
run behaviour. Evidence from the unit root test showed that all variables are integrated of order one. 
Evidence from the causality shows that there is no significant long-run joint causality when firm 
performance is used as independent variables, this indicates that the jointly predictive power of the 
independent variables (Asaleye et al., 2020); grey directors, indigenous directors of the company, non- 
executive directors, board size and firm size may not have significance improvement on firm performance 
in the long-run. However, this can be considered in the short-run given the presence of joint causality 
moving from the independent variables to the dependent variables. The difference regarding short-term 
results might be because of recent 2016 corporate governance reforms in Nigeria that show up in short- 
term results but not over the long term. Consequently, evidence from the cointegration result shows the 
presence of a long-run relationship among the variables. This indicates that a policy change in one target 
variable may have an aggregate response on other variables. As such, an effective policy change in one of 
the independent variable may be considered to simulate better performance in the long-run. Evidence 
from the fully modified least square showed grey director is not statistically significant with the inde-
pendent variable, firm performance in the long-run in Nigeria despite the strong connection established 
theoretically. Many factors may be responsible for this among others include the inability to strengthen 
long-run relationship due presence of a conflict of interest; long-term increase on extra cost and 
mismanagement of resource; incapability to ensure long-term contractual agreement and information 
asymmetry. Scholars reported that the monitoring through the board of directors generates extra cost 
which may result in inefficiency in the long-run (Abu et al., 2016; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972); and also there 
is a tendency for conflict of interest in the long-run due to separation of ownership (Panda & Leepsa, 
2017). The indicators representing indigenous directors of the company, non-executive directors and 
board size have a significant positive relationship with firm performance. This is in line with studies by 
(Obaretin, 2015; Otman, 2014) among others that stressed that the presence of directors creates an 
atmosphere for better firm performance. Long-term consideration benefits among agents may encou-
rage patronizing self-interest rather than organization goals. Finally, board size with a positive significant 
relationship with firm performance indicates that there is a significant improvement of the effectiveness 
of group decision in the long-run while the negative relationship with firm size in the long-run may be as 
the result of substitution effect inputs used in operation.
5. Conclusion and policy recommendation
The relationship among grey directors, corporate governance and firm performance remains 
inconclusive in both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Agency theory stressed that the 
executive managers act to actualize the goals and objectives of the owners or shareholders of the 
organization. However, monitoring generated an extra cost on the organization and may lead to 
inefficiencies. Although, empirical studies in relation to grey directors are scanty in African, most 
especially Nigeria. Hence, this study investigates the impact of grey directors and corporate 
governance on the performance of selected Nigeria deposit money banks both in the long and 
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short run. This work also aims at determining how important grey directors are in the board 
composition of every company. Studies have established that there is a casual relationship 
between various board composition (inside directors, outside directors, non-executive directors, 
CEO duality, gender diversity) and financial performance of firms but the joint short-run and long- 
run causality were disconnected from many studies and make the analysis limited in policy 
recommendations in respect to time frame perspectives.
Therefore, the study examines the joint short-run and long-run causality relationship between grey 
directors on the corporate performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Additionally, this study 
assessed the long-run behaviour between grey directors and performance of the selected deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. The outcome of this study shows that there is no evidence of joint long-run 
causality grey directors and corporate performance of selected Nigeria deposit money banks. 
However, the findings reveal joint short-run causality between grey directors and corporate perfor-
mance of selected Nigeria deposit money banks. Furthermore, examining the long-run behaviour, we 
found a positive significant relationship between indigenous directors, the board size, non-executive 
directors and performance of the selected deposit money banks in Nigeria, while a negative relation-
ship was observed with firm size and grey directors was insignificant in the long-run. The general 
conclusion is that efforts should be geared to maximise the effectiveness of group decision in the long- 
run, given the long-run positive significance of board size with performance of the bank. This will 
reduce agency costs. This study only focused on the bank sector in Nigeria. It is suggested that future 
study should consider the implications of grey directors on other sectors such as the manufacturing 
sector and insurance companies. This would help to understand the behaviour in other sectors in order 
to promote aggregate benefit in the economy.
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